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ABSTRACT
As the global economy grows, so does the demand for energy. Investment in clean energy projects, including geothermal, is increas-
ingly important to help meet these growing energy needs. Clean energy projects are also important for environmental reasons and 
as part of the battle against climate change. Many clean energy sources in the world are located in developing countries2, including 
emerging market economies. Investors in developing countries are normally faced with higher risks than those investing in high 
income developed economies. Higher risks in turn reduce capital flows to developing countries. This is particularly true during times 
of economic and financial crisis. At the same time energy projects tend to be large and capital intensive with long repayment periods. 
Energy projects also often require partnership between the public and private sectors i.e. public private partnerships (PPPs). Efficient 
allocation of risks among the different partners in PPPs is important for success, generally results in more profitable projects, and is 
more likely to benefit all parties involved. This article discusses public private partnerships in the energy sector in developing coun-
tries, characteristics of developing countries, the risk faced by investors, the absence of an international regime for investment, and 
risk mitigation instruments offered by international financial institutions to manage risks3. 
KEYWORDS: Clean and renewable energy investments, geothermal projects, developing and emerging market economies, risks 
and risk mitigation instrument.
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Introduction
As the global economy grows, so does the demand for energy. Investment in clean energy projects is 
increasingly important to meet these growing energy needs. Considerable clean energy sources in the world, 
including geothermal, are located in developing countries. Investors in those markets often face higher risks 
than those investing in high income developed economies with a more favourable investment and business 
climate. Higher risks in turn reduce capital flows to developing countries. 
The aim of this article is to discuss cross border clean energy projects in developing countries. The char-
acteristics of developing countries will be discussed, as will the risks faced by investors and risk mitigation 
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interest: international finance 
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2 Developing countries in this article means countries that are eligible for financial assistance from international 
financial institutions. Those developing countries include countries classified by the World Bank Group as: low 
income countries, lower middle income countries and upper middle income countries. Emerging market countries, 
which are often in the middle income category, are also classified as developing countries in this article. 
3 The international institutions focused on are those such as the World Bank Group, and regional development banks, 
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instruments offered by IFIs and ECAs to manage those risks. The main research questions are: How can 
risks be mitigated when investing in clean energy projects in developing countries? Does the international 
community offer a comprehensive framework for risk mitigation for investments in developing countries?
The methodology used in this article is the case study method. Compared to other research methods, a 
case study enables the researcher to examine the issues involved in greater depth. According to Yin (Yin, 
2009: 101–102) six sources of evidence are most commonly used in case studies. These are: documenta-
tion, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artefacts. Each 
of these sources has advantages and disadvantages and according to Yin one should “note that no single 
source has a complete advantage over all the others. In fact, the various sources are highly complementary, 
and a good case study will therefore want to use as many sources as possible” (Yin, 2009: 101). Among the 
sources of evidence used for the analysis in this article are secondary data, including reports and scholarly 
literature, articles and books. The author also interviewed and exchanged emails with various experts when 
writing this article.
1.  Cross border investments in challenging business environments.
Utilizing clean energy resources is a global issue affecting both rich and poor countries. Many devel-
oping countries and emerging market countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have large geothermal 
resources, but most are only in the early stages of development in using those resources. Future growth in 
demand for electricity is also likely to be strongest in those emerging regions. Transition to clean energy 
could be of great benefit to those regions as well as having global implications, environmentally, and in the 
battle against climate change.4 However, it is not sufficient to have the natural resources and potential growth 
in future demand. Funding is also needed and energy investments tend to be large, capital intensive and with 
long repayment periods. In addition to government and donor contributions, private sector participation is 
important. However, developing countries often have challenging business and investment environments 
that discourage private sector cross border engagement. 
The World Bank publishes the so called “Doing Business” report annually. The report presents quanti-
tative indicators that can be compared across 189 economies—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and over 
time. In its 2014 report the World Bank ranked 189 countries (World Bank, 2013a). The best performing 
country is ranked 1 and the worst performing country is ranked 189. The bank uses eleven indicators5 that 
are then combined into one overall indicator: Ease of doing business. Table 1 shows some selected indica-
tors for the business and investment climate in some developing countries that the World Bank6 expects will 
have significant additions in installed geothermal capacity in the future (World Bank, 2012: 31). As Table 1 
shows, most of these countries face challenging business and investment environments. African countries 
tend to be low income whereas Asian and Latin American countries tend to be middle income. In most coun-
tries companies have difficulty getting electricity and they also score low on indicators that are important for 
cross border energy investment, such as dealing with construction permits, protecting investors, enforcing 
contracts and trading across borders. Investors, especially those considering long term investments, will 
4 For a comprehensive discussion about the risks, uncertainty and the economics of climate change, see Nordhaus 
2013, The Climate Casino. For an excellent analysis on the regime complex for climate change, see Keohane and 
Victor 2011.
5 Regulations affecting 11 areas in the life of a business are covered in the 2014 “Doing Business” report: starting 
a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, and employing workers. 
The employing workers data was not included in the ranking on the ease of doing business in the 2014 report.
6 The World Bank Group represents five institutions. These are: (i) the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, IBRD, established in 1944, (ii) the International Development Association, IDA, established in 1960, 
(iii) the International Finance Corporation, IFC, established in 1956, (iv) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, MIGA, established in 1988, (v) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID, 
established in 1966. Four of these institutions issue insurance or guarantees, i.e.: IBRD, IDA, IFC and MIGA.
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avoid difficult business and investment environments unless risks can be managed. Proper risk mitigation 
for operators and investors is thus a major challenge in most of the African countries listed below as well in 
many developing and emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. 
Table 1 below only provides some indication for investors. The “Doing Business” report does not meas-
ure the full range of factors, policies and institutions that affect the quality of the business environment in an 
economy or its national competitiveness. It does not, for example, capture aspects of security, the prevalence 
of bribery and corruption, market size and macroeconomic stability7. A more thorough review would be 
needed for a company to make a decision about cross border engagement. Nevertheless the “Doing Busi-
ness” report is a useful start to begin identifying challenges in each country. Gaining a fuller understanding 
of the broader business environment, and a broader perspective on policy challenges requires combining in-
sights from “Doing Business” with data from other sources, such as World Bank Enterprise Surveys8. Other 
indicators more specific to the regulatory environment for energy investment also need to be studied and 
assessed. Moreover, political or non-commercial risks are associated with cross border investments. These 
will be discussed below.
Table 1. According to the World Bank, significant additions in installed geothermal capacity can be expected in the 
following African and Asian countries
Region Income Level Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
Rank
Getting  
Electricity
Dealing 
with Con-
struction 
Permits
Protecting 
Investors
Enforcing 
Contracts
Trading 
Across 
Borders
Africa
Tanzania Low income 145 102 177 98 42 139
Eritrea Low income 184 95 189 115 67 170
Sudan Lower middle income 149 113 167 157 154 155
Somalia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Malawi Low income 171 183 173 80 145 176
Zambia Low middle income 83 152 57 80 120 163
Burundi Low income 140 161 126 34 177 175
Rwanda Low income 32 53 85 22 40 162
Uganda Low income 132 178 143 115 117 164
Congo, Dem.  
Rep. 
Low income 183 142 90 147 177 171
Mozambique Low income 139 171 77 52 145 131
Madagascar Low income 148 187 157 68 160 115
Comoros Low income 158 109 44 138 159 146
Mauritius Upper middle income 20 48 123 12 54 12
Pacific Asia
Malaysia Upper middle income 6 21 43 4 30 5
Papua New 
Guinea
Lower middle income 113 24 165 68 168 134
Latin America
Guatemala Lower middle income 79 34 61 157 97 116
Honduras Lower middle income 127 125 83 170 182 84
Panama Upper middle income 55 16 62 80 127 11
Columbia Upper middle income 43 101 24 6 155 94
Ecuador Upper middle income 135 138 64 138 99 122
Bolivia Lower middle income 162 128 136 138 131 126
Source: World  Bank, 2012 and 2013a
7 Including whether the government manages its public finances in a sustainable way.
8 See, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org 
ISSN 2029-9370 (Print), ISSN 2351-6542 (Online). Regional FoRmation and development StudieS, no. 3 (17)
63
2. Geothermal resource risk constraints
In addition to the risks associated with cross border investments and operations, geothermal power pro-
jects also suffer from risks not found in other thermal power generation projects, including higher upfront 
development costs associated with uncertainty as to site capacity (Delmon, 2009). Risks associated with geo-
thermal projects are high during the pre-survey, exploration and test drilling phases9. Validating geothermal 
resources through test drilling is capital intensive. Commercial financing for test drilling is generally hard to 
find and private equity and government support are often the only sources of capital to undertake test drilling. 
These risks are not specific to developing and emerging markets, but it is often more challenging to obtain 
private and public capital in these markets than in high income countries. IFIs have so far done little to mobi-
lize funding for resource risk mitigation for geothermal projects in developing countries (see Table 2). They 
have mostly spent their resources on the less risky production phase after the more risky exploratory phase 
is completed. Here IFIs are failing in their role to promote geothermal development in developing countries.
Scaling up geothermal by addressing the resource risk through sustained international effort is being dis-
cussed at the World Bank, including raising US$500 million for exploration and drilling activity.10 This is a 
modest number given the global needs but recently the World Bank has made progress in its capital mobiliza-
tion efforts. In Europe a European Geothermal Risk Insurance Fund is being established (GEOELEC, 2013).
Table 2. Three decades of cumulative lending for geothermal energy development (US$ million)
International financial institutions (IFIs) Exploratory 
Phase
Production
Phase
Technical 
Assistance
Total
World Bank 117 1,544 48 1.710
African Development Bank 4 124 – 129
Asian Development Bank – 554 3 557
European Investment Bank – 256 – 256
Inter-American Development Bank 3 403 11 416
Total 124 2,881 62 3.068
Source: World Bank, 2013b
3. Private sector cross border investment in developing countries
Private sector funding and participation in clean energy projects is a challenge for many reasons. One 
of these is that the host government is often the only buyer of the electricity or hot water produced i.e. it is 
the so called offtake purchaser11. Many developing countries with large clean energy potential have limited 
creditworthiness. They have low per capita income and are often going through economic and political tran-
sition. In these cases the sponsors12 of a project might hesitate to fund the project because of uncertainty with 
the income stream from the investment made. Lenders, including commercial investment banks, would also 
9 Until the first borehole has been drilled into the geothermal reservoir, developers cannot be sure about the exact 
parameters (temperature and flow rate) of a planned geothermal electricity project. Once drilling has taken place, in 
situ pump tests, temperature and hydrological measurements then reduce the resource risk and can make it easier to 
attract external capital (GEOELEC, 2013: 6).
10 On March 6, 2013, World Bank Managing Director Sri Mulyani launched the Global Geothermal Development Plan 
(GGDP) in Reykjavik, Iceland. The GGDP is a call to all donors and sponsors of geothermal energy to join hands 
in mobilizing additional concessional resources and fund a pipeline of geothermal resource validation projects. 
According to the World Bank this is a way to address a critical financing gap and to help scale up geothermal energy 
and expand clean energy access (According to an email from the World Bank on February 17, 2014).
11 An off take purchaser is a purchaser of the product produced by a project. In the case of a power project the product 
produced is the electricity generated. 
12 A sponsor of a project is a party wishing to develop or undertake a project. A sponsor would normally provide 
financial support for the project e.g. early equity capital.
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often hesitate to provide loans to such projects because of uncertainty whether the project company, whose 
income stream is at risk, can service its loans. 
One possible institutional arrangement to address this situation is to form a PPP and use the Build-Oper-
ate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. The PPP becomes a venue for the public and private sectors to cooperate on a 
project that would traditionally have been in the public domain. The BOT arrangement means that the project 
is transferred back to the government when the concession13 agreement ends. In this situation efficient and 
effective risk allocation is key to success and the international community can play a constructive role, e.g. 
through IFIs that can offer a variety of risk mitigation instruments. Among the remedies that investors can 
apply to manage risks is partnership with IFIs and/or participation in a consortium with stronger partners. 
National institutions such as ECAs, which support trade finance, can also play a constructive role in reducing 
the risks taken by private sector investors, see for example Hilmarsson and Dinh (2013).
4.  Public Private Partnerships.  Some definit ions and theoretical  considerations
Public private partnerships (PPPs) can be a feasible platform to fund infrastructure development and to 
increase the efficiency of public sector service delivery. Infrastructure projects in the energy sector are often 
large, capital intensive and long term. Repayment periods are also often long. It can take a private investor 
10 to 25 years to recover the investment and the project returns. 
The private sector is recognized as a significant financing source for meeting developing country invest-
ment requirements, but financial markets remain largely untapped for this purpose and have yet to live up 
to their potential (Asian Development Bank, 2006). PPPs are one platform worth considering for the private 
sector to engage in infrastructure projects. Private capital, donor support (including IFIs) and public funds 
can be combined in a PPP project. A well designed policy and institutional framework for PPPs offers the op-
portunity to leverage and combine all three sources of financing and expertise without crowding out private 
investment. By forming a PPP both public and private sectors can share the risks and rewards of infrastruc-
ture projects.
There are many different definitions for PPPs. One definition is “any public sector service provided par-
tially or wholly by the private sector” (Delmon, 2009: 601). Another definition is “co-operative institutional 
arrangements between public and private sector actors” (Hodge and Greve, 2009: 33). Yet another definition 
of a PPP is “the transfer to the private sector of investment projects that traditionally have been executed or 
financed by the public sector” (World Bank, 2008: 93). 
To engage in cooperation, the public and private sectors can employ several different schemes14 includ-
ing the so called BOT, i.e. Build-Operate-Transfer (IMF, 2004). In BOT projects the private sector is respon-
sible for financing, constructing and operating the project. Under this arrangement the host country grants a 
concession, i.e. the right for a private firm to undertake a public sector project and operate it over an agreed 
period. When the concession expires the ownership of the project is transferred back to the party granting 
the concession. For a comprehensive discussion on BOTs see Jeffrey Delmon’s outstanding book on Private 
Sector Investment in Infrastructure (Delmon, 2009).
The partners typically involved in a BOT project are: the project company that undertakes the project, 
the host government (that can also be the offtake / power purchaser), the shareholders, the lenders, the gran-
tor, the construction contractor, the operator, the offtake purchaser/power purchaser, and the input supplier. 
Figure 1 below shows a typical PPP BOT contractual structure.
                           
13 A concession is the right granted by the host government for a private company to undertake a public sector project 
and operate it over an agreed period.
14 PPP schemes and modalities other than Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) include for example: Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT), Build-Rent-Own-Transfer (BROT), Build-Lease-Operate-Transfer (BLOT), Build-Transfer-
Operate (BTO).
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Figure 1. Typical PPP BOT contractual structure
Source: Constructed by the author
The project company uses the income stream from the project to service its debt and to pay returns to 
its investors (i.e. the equity contributors to the project company). The lenders to a BOT project might, for 
example, be commercial investment banks, IFIs and bilateral agencies. The IFIs and ECAs could also serve 
as guarantors e.g. for payment to the lenders, including commercial investment banks. The lenders would be 
keen to manage their risks (i.e. only take measurable and measured risks) and would receive a fixed margin 
on their loan whereas the shareholders (i.e. the equity holders in the project company) maximize the profits 
on their equity investment. In addition to obtaining funding for the project, the project company procures 
the design and coordinates the construction and operation of the project in line with the requirements of the 
concession agreement. Project company shareholders often include firms with construction and operation 
experience, and with offtake purchase capabilities (Delmon, 2009: 98). 
The offtake purchase agreement secures the project payment stream. The offtake purchaser will be look-
ing for guaranteed long term output from the project. The credit risk associated with the offtake purchaser 
will be of particular concern to the project company and the lenders. This is where guarantees from host 
governments or IFIs, including the World Bank, become important.
Critical to the design of PPPs is the way risks are allocated between the partners in the PPP. A general 
principle is that risk should fall on the party that is more able to do something about it. Risks in PPP tend to 
be allocated on the basis of commercial and negotiating strength. The stronger party will allocate risk that it 
does not want to bear to the weaker party. Efficient allocation of risk will generally result in a more success-
ful and profitable project and will benefit each of the parties involved (Delmon, 2009). 
In order to minimize the market risk from the project company and the project lenders, an offtake pur-
chase agreement, or in the case of a power project, a power purchase agreement, may be made. This is to cre-
ate a secure payment stream which will be an important basis for financing the project. The offtake purchaser 
Hilmar Þór Hilmarsson
FUNDING GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR...
66
may also be the grantor, or a government entity such as a public utility, in which case the offtake purchase 
agreement and the concession agreement may be one and the same document (Delmon, 2009).
The lenders will want project risks to be allocated to project participants, i.e. the construction contractor 
and the operator and not the project company, which is their debtor. 
The project company will enter into a contract with the construction contractor in order to divest its 
obligations to the grantor to design, build, test, and commission the project. Completion risk for the project 
should be allocated to the construction contractor.  In the case of a turnkey project, completion and perfor-
mance risk should be on the construction contractor.
If the main risks are associated with poor management of the service, shifting the risk to the operator 
could provide the right incentives to ensure that the project delivers. If risks are related to changes in policies, 
then the government should bear the risk. This is because the project company will not generally be able to 
manage political risk. The project company will ask the government to bear those risks, not necessarily to 
claim compensation at a future date but to pressure the government to avoid such risks and to minimize the 
probability that such risks will occur.
5.  The absence of an international framework for mitigating polit ical  r isks
When discussing international investors’ efforts to manage political risks Wells (2005) discusses four 
options: (i) international arbitration, (ii) official political risk insurance, (iii) home government support, and 
(iv) official credit. 
In the absence of a global investment agreement like the GATT and later the WTO15, investors have turned 
to piecemeal solutions when protecting their rights in risky countries. According to Wells, “these agreements 
set out rules for trade, but they provided few rules for investment... They did nothing to manage the political 
risks that could hinder foreign investment. Starting with the aborted International Trade Organization of the 
immediate post-World War II era, several efforts to create a similar global framework for investment came 
to naught. The history of failure did not encourage renewed efforts to create a comprehensive approach”. 
Further, Wells states that “[t]he resulting system, however, was not the product of any grand design but the 
result of uncoordinated steps by various parties. Certainly, some of the problems of the new system derive 
from the lack of a single framework; even more important problems can be attributed to the lack of explicit 
negotiation and mutual acceptance among the affected parties” (Wells, 2005: 89–90). 
This failure described by Wells is especially serious if one considers clean energy projects that tend to be 
large, capital intensive and long term. Furthermore, energy resources are to a large extent located in develop-
ing and emerging countries that are also currently growing faster than high income industrialized countries 
both in terms of GDP and population, and thus energy use. When host governments cannot make credible 
long term commitments to foreign investors, those investors will tend to avoid these projects. This becomes 
especially troubling during times when there is a global need for transition to clean energy projects. As 
Wells points out, “the need to satisfy the demand for security grew as the international community became 
increasingly eager to encourage private foreign investors to build infrastructure – roads, power plants, water 
systems – in the developing world” (Wells, 2005: 89). “Without external protection, direct investors in these 
industries would have to be very brave, or perhaps ignorant, to enter these industries, where they would have 
little bargaining power once their capital was committed” (Wells, 2005: 89). 
The international community increasingly emphasizes clean energy investment for environmental rea-
sons and as part of the battle against climate change. To promote those investments the international com-
munity uses for example IFIs. Table 3 shows that there is currently a focus on clean and renewable energy, 
and climate action among most IFIs. Some institutions (the African Development Bank, and IFC and MIGA 
from the World Bank Group) do not mention this specifically, but presumably those kinds of investments 
15 As Salacuse (2010) has pointed out, an international regime is normally „supported by a multilateral international 
organization. For example, the global trade regime rests upon the WTO, a robust international organization. The 
international investment regime has nothing similar“ (Salacuse, 2010: 467). 
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would fall under infrastructure investments that they as well as all the other IFIs mention as key private sec-
tor focus areas.
Table 3. International financial institutions and key private sector focus areas
Institution Key Private Sector Focus Areas
Asian Development Bank Infrastructure, capital markets, and financial sectors, with 
increasing focus on clean and renewable energy, frontier 
markets, and underserved economies.
African Development Bank Infrastructure, financial sector, industry, agribusiness, services, 
regional integration, and inclusive growth.
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development
Industry, commerce and agribusiness, natural resources, 
renewable energy, infrastructure, financial institutions, and 
SMEs.
European Investment Bank Infrastructure, energy, climate action, financial markets, 
SMEs, microfinance, and industry.
Inter-American Development Bank.  
Nonsovereign Guaranteed Operations.
Infrastructure, energy, transport, water and sanitation, 
industry, agribusiness, natural resources, financial institutions, 
capital markets, trade finance, health care, education, tourism, 
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and 
climate change.
International Finance Corporation – World 
Bank Group
Frontier markets and International Development  Association 
countries, sustainability, infrastructure, agribusiness, health 
and education, financial markets, and SMEs.
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – 
World Bank Group
 International Development  Association and conflict-affected 
countries, infrastructure, and South-South investment projects
Source: International Finance Corporation, 2011
Partnership with private investors has for a long time been a central part of IFI support to the private 
sector. Most IFIs limit their participation in a project investment to well under 50 percent, thus requiring 
partnership with other investors. The structure of IFI finance substantially leverages the capital provided by 
governments. Not only do IFIs borrow significantly from outside to support their operations, but they also 
invest in projects alongside private financiers and sponsors. Indicatively, the net result is that one dollar of 
capital supplied to an IFI by governments can lead to $12 of private sector project investment (IFC, 2011). 
IFIs generally need to demonstrate that their financing is essential, beyond what commercial finance 
would provide on its own, and that they can add value through risk mitigation and improved project design 
that leads to better overall development outcomes. They need to ensure that they crowd in investment and do 
not harm development of private financial markets. Most IFIs recognize this need, and many call their special 
role “additionally”, that is, the value they bring to a project beyond what private sector financial institutions 
could typically offer (IFC, 2011). 
IFI participation can help projects in developing countries in two ways: (1) making them more com-
mercially viable through, for example, better finance, improved risk mitigation, advice; and (2) improving 
their developmental outcomes by, for example, providing the advice and standard setting that lead to better 
operations, products, and services; stronger environmental, social, and corporate governance activities; or 
projects that are more inclusive (IFC, 2011). IFIs also tend to provide finance with longer maturities, which 
is generally beyond the risk appetite of private capital (IFC, 2011). 
IFIs clearly can be catalysts to support PPP projects, including in the energy sector; however, as stated 
above they tend to be bureaucratic and this can cause problems and be costly for the private sector. 
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6. The need for IFIs to make more use of their  guarantee powers.
The ongoing debate about the role of IFIs increasingly recognizes the importance of making greater use 
of the risk mitigation potential inherent in their unique multilateral structure (Asian Development Bank, 
2006). The World Economic Forum (WEF)16 has, for example, argued strongly for IFIs to better use guar-
antee and risk mitigation instruments and capabilities to attract increased commercial investment in de-
velopment projects. In 2006 the WEF issued a report entitled “Building on the Monterrey Consensus: The 
Untapped Potential of Development Finance Institutions to Catalyze Private Investment”. In this report the 
WEF specifically asserted that: “…the weight of DFI [development finance institutions] activities should 
shift over time from direct lending to facilitating the mobilization of resources from the world’s large private 
savings pools – international and domestic – for development – oriented investment through: wider use of 
risk mitigation instruments to alleviate part of the risk faced by investors; and stronger direct support for ca-
pacity building to strengthen the enabling environment for investment” (World Economic Forum, 2006: 9).
Furthermore the WEF argued that development financial institutions should “adapt their services, culture 
and capital allocation to the imperative of “crowding in” domestic and foreign private investment by placing 
much more emphasis on such risk mitigation instruments as partial guarantees as transitional strategy and 
on capacity building” (World Economic Forum 2006: 10) and that “an international consensus has emerged, 
embodied by the Monterrey Consensus, that a deeper partnership between the public and private sector is 
needed if we are to achieve common development objectives” (World Economic Forum, 2006, p. 10). In 
its final recommendations the WEF says: “The overwhelming majority of expert participants in the project 
recommended a major expansion of risk mitigation activity by DFIs…” (World Economic Forum, 2006: 15). 
While there is a clear need for risk mitigation in developing countries for sectors like the energy sector, 
it seems that IFIs, including the WBG, have some way to go to make those instruments widely used. IFIs 
need to do a better job in coordinating risk mitigation activities within themselves and spend more effort in 
marketing those products and to make them more efficient and more cost effective for the private sector and 
shorten their processing time. The use of political risk insurances has also not always resulted in favourable 
outcomes for developing counties as documented in detail by Wells and Ahmed in the case of Indonesia 
(Wells and Ahmed, 2007).  
7.  Overview of some sources of funding for cross border geothermal energy projects
This final section provides an overview of some possible sources of funding for cross border geothermal 
projects at an early, middle and late stage of project development. As discussed earlier in this article, high 
upfront development costs are associated with geothermal energy projects. At the initial phase risks are high 
but at the middle stage risks are medium and at the late stage the risks are low and projects may become 
bankable. Table 4 below provides an indication as to what funding sources and risk mitigation instruments 
might be feasible at each of the three stages of geothermal project development. Exploration and initial drill-
ing costs are especially difficult for developing countries with small fiscal budgets and a weak tax base. Un-
fortunately, as shown in Table 2, IFIs have been avoiding this high risk at the early phase of geothermal de-
velopment. Here they could and should do much more offering, for example, grants and concessional loans. 
Other donors should also get involved with grants or subsidized loans. During the middle and especially the 
late stage of project development IFIs should make more use of their guarantee and insurance instruments for 
capital mobilization attracting for example loans from international investment banks. Guarantees and insur-
ance instruments could also attract equity contributions from international investors and investment funds. 
16 The World Economic Forum’s Financing for Development Initiative comprises more than 200 global experts from 
financial institutions, corporations, governments, international organizations, universities, and nongovernmental 
organizations, who offer their views on improving the effectiveness of efforts to stimulate private sector investment 
in developing countries.
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IFIs should be able to price guarantee and insurance instruments lower than the private sector because 
they often engage with governments in developing countries on multiple projects and programs, which gives 
them as multilateral institutions leverage vis-à-vis developing country governments. An example of addi-
tional risk mitigation is to allow the host governments to own a stake in the geothermal power plant, which 
gives them an incentive to help ensure project success. 
As discussed above, IFIs, including the World Bank Group, have so far made little use of their guarantee 
powers to mobilize funding for clean energy projects. High costs and bureaucracy are cited as major reasons, 
not only by outside observers, but also by staff and managers within the World Bank. ECAs can also play an 
important role in facilitating trade of goods and services from providers in developed countries to geothermal 
projects in developing countries; see for example Dinh and Hilmarsson (2013).
Table 4. Overview of potential sources of funding for cross border geothermal projects
Stage of project 
development
Early Middle Late
Activities Exploration
Initial drilling
Resource confirmation
Field development
Production drilling
Power plant Construction
Commissioning
Risk of failure High risk Medium risk Low risk
Potential funding 
sources
Balance sheet financing 
from sponsors
Private equity from share-
holders/investors
Government cost sharing, 
concessional loans, grants, 
loan guarantees
Donor grants, IFIs and bi-
lateral donors
Concessional loans/funds 
from international donors, 
including IFIs* (e.g. World 
Bank IDA terms)
Balance sheet financing or 
corporate bonds from spon-
sors
Public equity
Construction debt
Loan guarantee by govern-
ment
Long term loan from IFIs* 
Guarantees from IFIs against 
non commercial risk to fa-
cilitate commercial lending
ECAs**/trade finance. 
Guarantees and insurance 
against commercial and non 
commercial risks. Buyer or 
Supplier credits. Direct loans
Long term loans from commer-
cial sources/investment banks
Long term loan from IFIs*
Guarantees from IFIs to attract 
commercial loans (larger loan 
allocation, longer term, lower 
interest rate)
ECAs**/trade finance. Guaran-
tees and insurance against com-
mercial and non commercial 
risks. Buyer or Supplier credits. 
Direct loans
*IFIs: International Financial Institutions: Lending, equity, guarantees, grants and policy reform
**ECAs: Export Credit Agencies: Guarantees for trade finance and loans
Source: Constructed by the author
Conclusions
Most future increase in demand for electricity is likely to come from developing and emerging market 
economies. This is also where most of the clean energy resources are located. This offers a tremendous op-
portunity for developing countries, but is also a challenge, including with funding. Sufficient private funds 
will not flow into these countries unless the risk profile of energy projects can be reduced. 
To fill the tremendous energy infrastructure gap in developing countries the public and private sectors 
need to work in partnership, including via PPPs. Such partnerships can be supported by IFIs. For large en-
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ergy project partnerships, pooling public, private and donor funds should not crowd out the private sector. 
Instead they offer the potential to crowd in private funds to risky markets that would not get private invest-
ment without proper risk mitigation.
In the absence of a global investment agreement, like the GATT and subsequently the WTO on trade, 
investors have turned to piecemeal solutions when protecting their rights in risky countries. This failure to 
create a global framework for investment is especially serious if one considers clean energy projects, which 
tend to be large, capital intensive and long term. 
IFIs can be important partners not only with direct funding, i.e. loans and equity investments, but also 
increasingly through risk mitigation instruments. IFIs need to provide instruments that are more flexible and 
more cost effective for the private sector and with a shorter processing time. Better coordination is needed 
between World Bank Group institutions providing guarantees/insurances, as indeed is better marketing of 
those instruments. In a recent World Bank publication, two World Bank staff members who have been coun-
try directors, describe the World Bank as a high-cost/high-hassle partner of last resort. They also argue that 
the World Bank needs to better understand the constraints under which the private sector works (Porter and 
Shivakumar, 2010). Clearly the bank needs internal reform in order to achieve its potential in mobilizing 
private sector capital via its financial instruments, especially guarantees and insurance products. 
ECAs can also play a constructive role in supporting exporters of equipment and services to developing 
and emerging markets by providing guarantees and insurance against commercial and non-commercial risk 
to facilitate longer term lending and at more affordable cost.  
This article shows that the global system to support cross border investment in developing and emerging 
markets is fragmented and the international community offers only piecemeal solutions, e.g. via IFIs such as 
the World Bank and regional development banks. However, internal evidence from the World Bank suggests 
that it is difficult for the private sector to use the instruments offered. The World Bank has so far hesitated 
to use its guarantee powers in any significant way and thus does less to help mobilize as much private sec-
tor capital to developing and emerging countries as it could. This is especially unfortunate for investment in 
clean energy infrastructure where investments tend to be large, capital intensive and with long repayment 
periods. IFIs are well suited to mitigating non-commercial risks in emerging markets e.g. because of their 
global nature and because they often engage in policy dialogue with host governments and can facilitate 
regulatory reform often needed in emerging markets. IFIs including the World Bank have also so far done 
little to help fund the high upfront development costs for geothermal projects in developing countries. Here 
they should team up with other development institutions with grants and concessional lending to help make 
geothermal projects in developing countries bankable.
IFIs have failed to provide efficient and effective support for cross border infrastructure investment in 
developing countries. Among the results is underinvestment in clean energy investment globally. In spite of 
all the talk from IFIs about clean energy and the battle against climate change, so far they have little to show 
when it comes to capital mobilization for clean energy projects. 
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Santrauka
Vystantis pasaulio ekonomikai, didėja ir energijos paklausa. Investicijos į švarios energijos, įskaitant 
geoterminės, projektus tampa vis svarbesnės siekiant padėti patenkinti šiuos augančius energijos poreikius. 
Švarios energijos projektai svarbūs ir aplinkosaugos tikslais, ir kaip kovos su klimato kaita dalis. Švarios 
Hilmar Þór Hilmarsson
FUNDING GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR...
72
energijos šaltinių pasaulyje gausu besivystančiose šalyse, įskaitant kylančias rinkos ekonomikos šalis. In-
vestuotojai besivystančiose šalyse paprastai susiduria su didesne rizika nei tie, kurie investuoja į aukštas 
pajamas turinčias išsivysčiusias ekonomikas. Didesnės rizikos savo ruožtu sumažina pinigų srautus į 
besivystančias šalis, ekonomikos ir finansų krizių laikotarpiu. Kartu energetikos projektai yra imlūs kapi-
talui, jiems būdingi ilgi grąžinimo laikotarpiai. Vykdant energetikos projektus dažnai turi bendradarbiauti 
viešasis ir privatus sektoriai, kitaip tariant, būtina viešojo ir privačiojo sektorių partnerystė (VPP). Efekty-
vus rizikų pasiskirstymas tarp skirtingų VPP partnerių yra svarbus, siekiant projekto sėkmės, paprastai tai 
tampa kitų pelningų projektų pagrindu ir dažnai būna naudingas visoms dalyvaujančioms šalims. Šiame 
straipsnyje aptariama viešojo ir privačiojo sektorių partnerystė energetikos sektoriuje besivystančiose šalyse, 
besivystančių šalių charakteristikos, rizikos, su kuriomis susiduria investuotojai, siūlomos rizikos mažinimo 
priemonės, siekiant jas valdyti. Straipsnyje atskleidžiama, kad pasaulinė tarptautinių investicijų palaikymo 
sistema besivystančioms ir naujoms rinkoms yra nesisteminė, nesuderinta, tarptautinė bendruomenė siūlo tik 
nesistemingus sprendimus, pvz., per tarptautines finansų institucijas (TFI), kaip Pasaulio bankas ir region-
iniai plėtros bankai. Tačiau duomenys iš Pasaulio banko rodo, kad privačiam sektoriui sudėtinga naudoti 
siūlomas priemones. Pasaulio bankas iki šiol privataus kapitalo organizacijoms ir besivystančių šalių organi-
zacijoms mažai tepadeda. Todėl nelengva užsitikrinti investicijų švarios energetikos infrastruktūrai, nes tai 
didelės, imlios kapitalui investicijos, kurių grąžinimo laikotarpis gana ilgas. TFI tinka, siekiant sušvelninti 
nekomercines rizikas augančiose rinkose dėl jų globalaus pobūdžio, nes bendradarbiauja su vyriausybėmis 
ir gali palengvinti reformų, kurios dažnai būtinos augančiose rinkose, reguliavimą. TFI, įskaitant Pasaulio 
banką, iki šiol nedaug tenuveikė, kad padėtų finansuoti pradines plėtros išlaidas geoterminiams projektams 
besivystančiose šalyse. Čia jie turėtų dirbti kartu su kitomis plėtros įstaigomis, gauti dotacijų ir lengvatinių 
paskolų, taip padėdami sėkmingai vykdyti geoterminius projektus besivystančiose šalyse.
PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: investicijos į švarią ir atsinaujinančią energiją, geoterminiai projektai, 
besivystančios ir kylančios rinkos ekonomikos, rizikos ir rizikų mažinimo priemonės.
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